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The BAROMETER is a student newspaper for the exchange of ideas and 
information concerning the development and improvement of the 
professional environment at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
*+*+*+*+*+*+*+* 
" .•• There is no conclusive evidence based on active-duty performance 
that the academies are justifying their expensive existence by 
producing the best officers who enter the armed forces. Neither is 
there any evidence that the performance of academy-trained officers 
is inferior to that of officers from other sources. Instead, the 
available information seems to indicate that the active-duty per-
formance of academy graduates is about equal to that of other 
regular officers. The high cost of the academies is, of course, 
not justifiable on this basis." 
(J. Arthur Heise, THE BRASS FACTORIES, p. 167) 
EDITORIAL COMMENT: Critical comments such as this week's quote made by J. Arthur Heise are 
common in the current effort by many members of Congress to reduce military spending in 
every category from bullets to textbooks. Just as the Postgraduate School received recent 
budget cuts as a result of congressional scrutiny, the officer procurement programs are 
also undergoing close review. Brooke Nihart points out the facts and figures which have 
inspired this controversy in this week's FEATURE. 
FEATURE: HIGH AND LOW 
"If there is strength through diversity the overall officer procurement picture is a 
positive one because it is certainly diverse in cost and results. Costs of a given program 
vary as much as 250% between services. Retention after nine years service is as little as 
5% in one program in one Service. 
Representative O. C. Fisher's (D-Tex.) Military Personnel Subcommittee of the RASC 
(and perhaps other Hill panels as well) is understood to be looking into these anomolies and, 
no doubt, will be asking some probing questions. 
Principle programs are the Service Academies-West Point, Annapolis, and Colorado Springs-
ROTCs-Regular or scholarship-and OCS. The accompanying table gives the estimates costs of 
these programs by Services for FY 73 together with the percentage difference between the most 
and least costly programs. 
Questions from the cost table are obvious. Why does it cost the Army two and one-half 
times as much as the Marine Corps to turn out a platoon leader in the OCS factory? Is the 
Army giving its officer candidates more costly and therefore better training? Or does the 
Marine Corps select candidates more carefully and therefore suffer less attrition in the 
ro ram? 
WHAT IT COSTS TO COMMISSION AN OFFICER FY 73 
ROTC ROTC 
Service Academies Non-ScholarshiE Scho1arshiE OCS 
Army $59,400 6,144 13,476 15,200 
Navy 54,224 6,353 14,862 4,650 
Marines 54,224* 6,353* 14,862* 4,361 
Air Force 62,100 9,200 13,600 5,300 
Difference** 15% 50% 10% 250% 
*Most Marines from these sources are from USNA and NROTC; thus figures are same as Navy 
** 
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One would think that non-scholarship ROTC programs have little difference in cost 
between the Services. Yet the Air Force program costs 50% more than the Army program. What 
is the Air Forces giving its "Rotsies" that the Army isn't-certainly not jet training I 
A 15% difference may seem non-significant but one would think that the Service Academies 
would exhibit more uniformity in program costs than a 15% discrepancy. Again, what is the 
Air Force giving its prospective career officers that the Navy isn't-better scientific 
training, a better athletic program? 
A 10% difference is still less but what does the Navy give its scholarship ROTC midship-
men that the Army and Air Force cadets don't get? 
In fairness it should be noted that the Army OCS cost per graduate is expected to drop 
to $10,021 in FY 74. Next year it will be only 100% more costly than the other OCS programs. 
On the other hand, the Air Force Academy cost per cadet jumpts to $65,900 in FY 74 or a 
significant 18% above its nearest competitor. Also the Navy scholarship ROTC program jumps 
to $17,769, a very significant 22% above its nearest competitor. 
Of course programs of the different Services are designed to turn out a gold bar basic 
officer but to do a job in but one Service. Seemingly comparable programs of different 
Services therefore might cost different amounts. Also, the different Services may be 
keeping their books differently and so may be coming up with non-comparable costs. Either 
way, differences ranging from 10% to 250% seem to be out of line and might well be scrutinized 
WHICH PROGRAMS TO RETAIN? 
A look at the second table (on retention by program) will prove to be revealing. Among 
the Services, Academy graduates tend to remain in the Service generally in higher numbers-
with one dramatic exception. That is, of all things, Army ROTC graduates who receive 
regular commissions, either as Distinguished Military Graduates or by accepting RA status 
after 2 years of obligated service. In 1971, after 10 years, 68% of the 1961 DMGs were still 
serving compared to 70% of the same USMA class. But 81% of the 1961 ROTC and OCS classes 
getting regular commissions were still in by 1971 compared to USMA's 70%. 
The five-year period, 1965-1970 is even more dramatic-76% of USMA class of 1965 were 
still in, 72% of the ROTC DMGs, and whopping 93% of RA ROTC and OCS graduates. What's more, 
these young officers-USMA, ROTC, and OCS-are the ones who fought the Vietnam War in the 
Company grades. Army ROTC, not to mention West Point, must be doing something right. 
In marked contrast is the Navy. One is forced to conclude that the Navy knows what it 
is talking about when it states that prolongea at-sea deployments of fleet units cause 
retention problems. For comparable 9-year periods USNA class retention varied between 
42% and 62%, substantially lower than USMA and USAFA and even lower than Marine USNA 
retention. 
NROTC graduates who received a full scholarship show up poorly at 18% while non-scholar-
ship grads are at the bottom of the bilges at 5%. OCS is little better at 9.5% while only 
ROC-a summer college program-shows favorably at a respectable 29%. It would seem that the 
long at-sea separation from family and "the real world" has a greater adverse effect on 
retention than an occasional exciting year of ground combat with troop duty in between. 
The Navy must-and is-looking into both ends of the retention problem, the officer programs 
and conditions of service. 
A glance at the Air Force entries suggests that an Air Force career is indeed appealing. 
The higher Academy costs of the Air Force (and the Army) seem to be paying off in increased 
retention while the Navy might well consider beefing up its program at Annapolis if initial 
motivation has any prospect at all of overcoming the sea duty "turn-off". 
While the Air Force has not had a scholarship ROTC until just recently, the results 
achieved with the non-scholarship program may justify the 50% greater cost. The need for a 
new scholarship program may even be questioned, although it may be needed to keep competitive 






WHICH PROGRAMS RETAIN? 
(Army over 5 and 10 years, Navy over 9 years, Marines 
over 6 years, Air Force over 7 years) 
ROTC ROTC 
Academies Non-Scho1arshiE Scho1arshiE OCS 
76%(65-70) 93%(65-70)* 
70%(61-71) 81%(61-71)* 




68 7.: (61-71)** 






31. 0% (PLC)+ 
Air Force 78 %(59-66) 43%(59-66) 54.0%(60-67) 
48.0%(65-72) 73%(65-72) 42%(65-72) 
*ROTC graduates (and some OCS) who integrated into Regular Army. 
**DMGs-Distinguished Military Graduates. 
***ROTC and OCS graduates remaining beyond 2 years obligated service. 
+ROC and PLC-Reserve Officers Class and Platoon Leaders Class-are programs 
wherein college students join the Reserve and attend summer officers' 
training. 
++Cumu1ative retention percentages of officer classes 1959 through 1966 after 
6 years service. 
+++Air Force had no scholarship ROTC program during these years. 
In sum, higher cost Air Force and Army programs seem t o bE"" paying off, the best payoff 
for the Navy seems to be the ROC summer reserve program. and for the Marines NROTC, OCS and 
PLC. 
But these comparisons can only be very rough and the programs are a mix designed for 
different purposes-the Academies to produce a core of professionals augmented from the 
other programs while the others-ROTC, OCS, etc.-provide the large numbers of short term 
junior officers so necessary in either war or peace. 
The various programs, separately and in comparison, should be and generally are under 
searching scrutiny for cost-effective improvements. Regardless of the apparent anomalies 
in cost and retention, the Academies are likely to continue to turn out professional 
officers augmented by at least some of the other programs." 
(Reprinted with the permission of the ARMED FORCES JOURNAL from their July 1973 issue) 
SERVICE NOTES 
***SALT SCRAP - "State and Defense Department officials are in near-open conflict over the 
position the U.S. should take regarding nuclear equality with the Soviet Union during the 
second-round strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) negotiations now under way in Geneva. 
State Department tends to lean towards the Soviet position that that country should retain 
the quantitative superiority over the U.S. it gained in the interim five-year SALT agree-
ment currently in force. Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger is on record as stating 
that the U.S. must attain a "total equity" with Russia in the nuclear weapons field 
coupled with an increased research and development effort to counter recent Soviet technical 
advances. The State Dept. and the National Security Council, on the other hand, believe 
the so-called detente emerging between the two super powers gives less importance to the 
questions of nuclear parity. On the record, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger says he 
agrees on the need for "total equity" but adds: "Is it (total equity) numbers, is it 
throw weight or is it warheads, is it everything? How do you compare superiority in bomb-
ers to superiority in missiles? How do you compare the throw weight or the carrying power 
of bombers with the throw weight of missiles? These are tough questions that have to be 
answered •••• " (AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY January 7, 1974). 
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***OIL RESERVES - "Nixon Administration's latest request to draw oil from Naval Petroleum 
Reserve No.1 in Elk Hills, Calif., faces stiff House opposition. By law, production 
there is limited to national defense needs. The Senate has passed a bill to develop and 
produce 160,000 barrels of oil per day from Elk Hills. House bill was introduced "at 
the request of the President" by House Armed Services Committee Chairman F. Edward Hebert 
(D.-La.) and Rep. William G. Bray IR.-Ind.). Rep. Hebert appointed a defense energy 
resources and requirements sub-committee, headed by Rep. Otis G. Pike (D.-N.Y.) to 
investigate the Pentagon's needs and report back by June 1. No action on release of Elk 
Hills reserves is planned until completion of the report by Rep. Pike. Some House members 
view the earmarking of military fuel allotments for airline use as a ploy to gain release 
of Elk Hills oil. If fuel continues to be earmarked for airline use, it could compound 
the Pentagon's present shortage and bring additional pressure to release Elk Hills oil. 
-
Rep. Pike will seek to determine if the military shortage is real or contrived to gain 
access to the naval petroleum reserves." (AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHOLOGY, January 14, 1974) 
